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Abstract
The Transport Certification Australia on-board
mass feasibility project is testing various on-board
mass devices in a range of heavy vehicles (HVs).
Extensive field tests of on-board mass (OBM)
measurement systems for HVs were conducted
during 2008. These tests were of accuracy,
robustness and tamper evidence of HV on-board
mass telematics. All systems tested showed
accuracies within approximately ±500 kg of gross
combination mass, or approximately ±2% of the
attendant weighbridge reading. Analysis of the
dynamic data also showed encouraging results,
and has raised the possibility of using such dynamic
information in tamper evidence in two areas. This
analysis was to determine if the use of averaged
dynamic data could identify potential tampering or
incorrect operating procedures, as well as the
possibility of dynamic measurements flagging a
tamper event by the use of metrics including a
tampering index. Technical and business options
to detect tamper events will now be developed
during implementation of regulatory OBM system
application to Australian HVs.
4On-board mass monitoring of heavy vehicles: results of testing program
Vol 19  No 1    March 2010    Road & Transport Research
INTRODUCTION
Transport Certification Australia (TCA) has
recently concluded the field testing portion of a
program to verify the accuracy, robustness and
tamper-evidence of heavy vehicle (HV) on-board
mass (OBM) devices. The program is part of a larger
feasibility study into the suitability of such devices
deployed in a regulatory framework for HVs.
Extensive testing was undertaken during 2008. The
process and results of the testing program, and a
discussion on the development of tamper-evidence
for OBM devices are presented in this paper.
BACKGROUND
TCA is a government-funded organisation that
administers the Intelligent Access Program (IAP,
www.iap.gov.au). The IAP provides HVs with
improved access to road networks in return for
route monitoring. The OBM project encompasses
technical feasibility and assessment of fit with the
IAP, leading to the development of functional and
technical specifications for an evidentiary on-board
mass monitoring system for HVs in Australia. The
project was undertaken from early 2008 to June
2009. An industry capability review in August 2007
(Karl and Han 2007) was presented before the project
inception. On the basis of this report and
observations from an international study tour (Davis
2008), it appeared that regulatory OBM applications
for HVs were feasible from an accuracy, tamper and
dynamic data-recording viewpoint. A test program
was set up to investigate further the feasibility
aspects of on-board mass measurement in a
regulatory environment for HVs. Accordingly, the
OBM testing program was set up under the overall
OBM project to undertake and report on the technical
and evidentiary feasibility of on-board mass
monitoring technology in Australia.
The key areas being investigated in this project
investigation are shown diagrammatically in Figure
1. The field testing was performed in three stages. In
April 2008, a pilot stage was proposed and a test
plan (Davis, Bunker and Karl 2008a) was developed
in consultation with jurisdictions and OBM system
suppliers. The pilot stage of the tests was conducted
from April to June 2008. Analysis of the data from
the pilot test was performed and the testing
procedure refined ready for full-scale testing (Davis,
Bunker, and Karl 2008b; Germanchev and Eady
2008). Full-scale tests of available OBM systems in
Australia occurred from July to October 2008.
PROCEDURES
The pilot test program consisted of testing six OBM
systems installed on two HVs, a B-double in
Queensland and a semitrailer in Victoria. Some test
vehicles had up to three OBM systems installed.
The full-scale field tests examined 12 OBM systems
from nine suppliers using seven vehicles: one rigid
truck, two truck and dog combinations, two
semitrailers, one B-double and one double road
train. As in the pilot tests, more than one OBM
system under test was installed per test vehicle.
The tests were conducted at various locations
around Australia, depending on vehicle and
weighbridge availability, at Brisbane, Sydney,
Melbourne, Scottsdale (Tas.) and Perth. The full-
scale testing program was conducted in line with
Davis et al. (2008a, b).
Figure 1
Overall OBM feasibility project
task/activity interrelations
(Karl 2007)
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As well as the data from each OBM system under
test, another set of data was recorded for cross-
validation. This data was recorded by the reference
OBM system, which was installed on all test HVs to
provide a common reference dataset across all test
vehicles, weighbridges and test OBM systems. This
allowed a comparison of the measured mass
reading of the reference OBM system to the measured
mass reading of the test OBM system and to the
reference mass reading from the weighbridge.
Accordingly, three readings were taken per test, one
from the reference OBM system, one from the test
OBM system and one of the reference mass from the
weighbridge. Suitable allowance for variations in
readings from one weighbridge to another could
therefore be made.
Static (stationary) tests
Six runs around a road circuit were conducted at
four loading conditions: fully laden, two-thirds
laden, one-third laden and unladen (i.e. at tare).
Each test HV in the pilot study had six runs with
different tests per run. Data were recorded from
each of the OBM systems installed on the test
vehicles.
Table 1 shows the combinations of test conditions
undertaken on the test vehicles. OBM systems for
air-sprung HVs generally use the air spring pressure
as a surrogate for mass indication, since the pressure
in the air spring is proportional to the force on it.
Accordingly, the primary transducers for OBM
systems on air-sprung HVs are air pressure
transducers (APTs). Applying the brakes can alter
the pressure in the air spring via brake wind-up,
bushing hysteresis and other effects; and hence
result in an inaccurate OBM reading. The effects of
these phenomena were examined in this test by
testing with brakes on and off.
The full-scale field testing program did not test the
OBM systems for the brakes on/off nor positive/
negative gradient situations. The inability to
replicate the cross fall slopes for the different road
circuits used at the different locations was the reason
these tests were deleted from the full-scale program.
Likewise, the inability to replicate the amount of
brake wind-up from one driver and HV unit to
another led to the removal of this part of the testing.
The static readings for the full-scale tests were
taken only on the weighbridges with the brakes off.
DYNAMIC (MOVING) TESTS
For each vehicle, a number of recordings were
performed while the vehicle was moving. These
recordings were made where the OBM system under
test was capable of measuring dynamic data. The
responses from the OBM systems were recorded for
a range of road irregularities during the tests,
including the test vehicles travelling over speed
bumps, braking suddenly and travelling around
curves. The reference system recorded data from all
test HVs for these tests.
TAMPER TESTS
In any commercial application, there is no incentive
for a driver to tamper with the OBM system, because
it is in the driver’s interests to obtain the most
reliable and accurate readings. On the other hand,
in regulatory applications, readings of an OBM
Table 1
All vehicles and systems tested (pilot or full-scale test)
Vehicle Brakes Test condition
B-double Off On weighbridge
On road with positive gradient
On road with negative gradient
On road with positive cross fall
On road with negative cross fall
Semi-trailer Off On weighbridge
On road with positive gradient
On road with negative gradient
On road with positive cross fall
On road with negative cross fall
B-double On On weighbridge
Semi-trailer On On weighbridge
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system may relate to penalties or fees paid by the
driver; tampering with the system can result in
inaccurate readings that favour the driver. Therefore,
it is in the regulator’s interest to prevent or detect
possible tamper events.
A range of tests was performed in order to determine
the potential for tampering and the ease with which
it could be detected. Not all tamper tests were
performed on each vehicle.
A ride-height adjustment test was performed.
Vehicles were placed on a weighbridge and a
standard static measurement (without ride-height
adjustment) was taken. The ride-height rod
adjustment linkage was then altered and the OBM
reading taken at the different ride height. A dynamic
run with the ride height at the factory setting and
then another at the altered setting were performed
on some vehicles; the OBM data were recorded for
both settings. These dynamic tests were recorded by
the reference OBM system and, where it was capable,
by the OBM system under test.
For one tampering test, air lines to the APTs were
blocked up using various measures, including
clamping and insertion of a ball valve. Only the
airline connected to the sensor was restricted, thus
allowing normal air flow and operation of the air
spring. Both static and dynamic tests were
performed with the ball valves closed. This allowed
comparison with the signals recorded for the case
of no tampering.
OBM systems for steel-sprung HVs use load cells for
mass indication. The tamper test for OBM systems
with these types of primary transducers comprised
of inserting a wedge between the load cell and its
mounting. This to observe the effect this action
would have on the readings. That this type of
tampering occurs in practice has been noted (Davis
2008).
Some OBM systems assume a load distribution to
calculate the load on the steer axle and subsequently
the gross vehicle mass (GVM), including a tare mass
value. This is particularly the case for prime movers
but also for those OBM systems on rigid HVs using
load cells distributed around the chassis/tray
interface. OBM measurement algorithms without
steer-axle sensors assume that the steer axle mass
does not alter markedly from tare to full load. These
assumptions were tested for HVs without steer axle
sensors by altering the steer axle load to a higher or
lower value from that assumed at the time of
calibration. The effect of changing the load
distribution of a rigid HV without steer axle sensors
was tested by placing the same test masses in
different locations around the payload area and
observing the change in total mass shown by the
OBM system readout. The majority of prime movers
with OBM systems fitted do not have steer-axle
sensors. Prime movers without steer-axle sensors
have OBM system algorithms containing an
assumption of an almost full fuel tank. Accordingly,
prime mover OBM system algorithms that assumed
a certain fuel mass were tested by either draining
the fuel tank or having the test team personnel stand
on the cabin of the test HV well forward of any
primary sensors on the drive axle(s). The readings
were then taken from the OBM system value vs. the
weighbridge value.
RESULTS
General
A total of twelve OBM systems from nine suppliers
were tested. The results here are offered as a
preliminary output from the project.
Each test generated a minimum of 72 samples (3
systems × 4 load conditions × 6 repeated tests = 72
samples). Each system had a number of sensors per
axle group, which further increased the test samples
available by sensor. At the primary sensor level, a
total of 4479 samples were collected across all test
conditions. There were 2175 samples gathered which
represented ‘normal’ operation, (i.e. brakes-off, level
ground, no simulation of tampering). This provided
an overall error per axle group of less than 170 kg
between the test data mean accuracy and the
population mean accuracy, with a level of confidence
of 95% using the worst-case axle group standard
deviation, s, of 429 kg (Germanchev and Eady 2008).
The most accurate results were obtained from a
static test under controlled circumstances (brakes
off, level ground, no tampering).
The number of plots and analysis modes from the
amount of data gathered was potentially large.
Accordingly, the following section presents some
examples of results from the analysis. Categories
are presented as examples rather than the entire
suite of a particular mode of analysis, e.g. percentage
error for gross vehicle mass then kg error per drive
axle group. In this way, representative samples are
presented rather than entire data sets.
Result specific to the pilot tests
The pilot test data analysis (Germanchev and Eady
2008) found that the static test on the weighbridge
with brakes on produced a much larger variation in
all of the OBM system readings, due to the
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inconsistent brake wind-up compared with the
variations measured for the same test with the brakes
released.
The load cell used in one of the OBM systems for the
pilot tests produced a less variable data set than the
APTs in the other systems, provided the brakes were
off. However, the weighbridge (brakes on) readings
for that load cell system exhibited a large amount of
variation in readings. This was likely due to the
moment being transferred onto (or off) the fifth
wheel load cells caused by trailer brake wind-up.
A sudden braking manoeuvre was required during
one of the pilot tests. This had considerable impact
on the load distribution of the test HV, in this case,
a B-double carrying grain. Subsequent tests used
loads that were not easily shifted, such as steel
beams or timber.
Tamper trials performed in the pilot study indicated
that some tampering events were relatively easy to
detect because OBM readings were altered markedly,
while other tampering events had little or no impact
on the readings.
Stopping the air flow to the APTs effectively altered
the load measured by the systems, although, as
there was no change in air pressures apart from a
gradual loss of pressure due to air leaks, a dynamic
plot of the data did not show any variation during
dynamic recording through corners or over bumps.
Ride-height adjustment tamper tests did not show
conclusively that adjusting the ride height on the
vehicle increased or decreased the loads measured
by the test systems.
Error distribution of all systems
Table 2 lists the test HVs and their associated (and
anonymised) OBM systems and configurations.
Figure 2 shows an error distribution for all axle
group measurements. This aggregate result includes
all OBM systems tested. The error is taken as the
difference between the OBM system and weighbridge
measurements and plotted along the x-axis. The
number of counts for each error is plotted on the y-
axis.
The distribution in Figure 2 indicates that the
standard deviation of all tested systems across all
axle groups was less than 260 kg, i.e. that 95% of the
population of OBM systems returned a mass reading
within a maximum range of 520 kg either side of the
mean.
Scatter plots for measured load versus
weighbridge load
A scatter (x–y) plot was generated to assist
assessment of the linearity of the OBM systems
tested. The results of the test OBM reading, or
measured mass, were plotted on the y-axis and the
weighbridge reading, or reference mass, on the x-
axis. This was per test vehicle, per system, per axle
group and per gross combination mass (GCM).
Figure 3 shows an anonymised example of the
linearity assessment for a single axle group for a test
B-double.
In a perfect system, the characteristic equation:
y = mx + c (1)
would have a gradient (m) of 1.0, an offset (c) of 0 and
an R2 value of 1.0 to indicate a perfect fit.
The full set of plots for this program is yet to be
released. Space limitations preclude providing the
entire set in this paper and they, properly, lend
themselves to a report format. This report was issued
by the project team in May 2009 (Karl et al. 2009).
Figure 3 shows a good fit across the OBM systems
installed on a B-double. It is worth noting that the
R2 values in the examples shown in Figure 3 were
ascribable to a combination of OBM reading
variations and the variation in the weighbridge
readings. Since combined accuracy was determined
by the square root of the sum of squares of the
individual accuracies, and the weighbridge
uncertainty was much smaller than that of the
reference system (as shown later), this effect was
minor.
OBM errors (in kg) by system
Figure 4 shows example box-and-whisker plots that
compare the accuracy and precision of (anonymised)
OBM drive-axle readings with the concomitant
weighbridge reading.
In a box-and-whisker plot, each vertical line
(whisker) shows the measured range for a particular
system. The box highlights the range in which 50%
of the data lie. The short horizontal line in the box
shows the median value of the data.
The accuracy and precision information in Figure 4
indicates that the range in the readings off the drive
axles from any OBM system was in error by (worst
case) approximately +/–500 kg for any load; with
the median reading varying by less than half this
value across systems.
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Table 2
All vehicles and systems tested (pilot and full test)
Vehicle System installed Configuration of measurement devices
on vehicle
B-double 6, 11, 12 APTs* on drive, trailer 1 and trailer 2 axle groups
Semi-trailer 4 Load cells on drive and APTs on trailer axle groups
5, 6, 11, 12 APTs on drive and trailer axle groups
13 APTs on trailer
Rigid truck 4 4 load cells at four corners of chassis
6, 11, 12 APTs on drive axle group
Truck and 2, 11, 12 APTs on drive, dolly and trailer axle groups
dog trailer 7 Deflection sensor on steer, APTs on drive, dolly and
trailer axle groups
Semi-trailer 2, 7, 11, 12 APTs on drive and trailer axle groups
B-double 9 Load cells on drive, APTs on trailer 1 and
trailer 2 axle groups
11, 12 APTs on drive, trailer 1 and trailer 2 axle groups
Semi-trailer 9 Load cells on drive and APTs on trailer axle groups
11, 12 APTs on drive and trailer axle groups
Truck and 3, 8, 11, 12 APTs on drive, dolly and trailer axle groups
dog trailer 10 Deflection sensor on steer, APTs on drive,
dolly and trailer axle groups
Double road train 1, 11, 12 APTs on drive, trailer 1, dolly and trailer 2 axle groups
* APT = air pressure transducer
Figure 2
Error
distribution for
all axle groups
GCM reading percentage error by systems
Figure 5 compares an example of GCM reading error
as a percentage for different (and again anonymised)
OBM systems at all load conditions.
The plots in Figure 5 show that the percentage
variation in GCM at all loads conditions, by any
supplier of OBM systems was in error by
approximately ±5% in the worst case.
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One of the aims of the OBM industry is to assist
operators to achieve as-close-to-legal loads as
possible without overloading. This goal is borne
out in the reduced error at full load compared with
all load conditions.
OBM error by vehicle type
Figure 6 compares the percentage errors for the
anonymised GCMs for different vehicle classes.
The plot shows that the GCM reading error by
vehicle type had a wider range over all load
conditions. As a preliminary hypothesis, the large
variation of readings shown in Figure 6 may be due
to under-reporting of steer axle mass by steer axle
sensors, where present on the vehicles tested,
particularly for the rigid trucks and truck and dog
trailer combinations. This phenomenon will be
further investigated by the OBM team, with any
necessary specification requirements put in place
for regulatory OBM applications. Large variations
were also found on the semitrailers, and this was
due to the inconsistency of calibration for OBM
systems tested on the vehicles.
OBM error by system for single vehicle
types
Figure 7 compares the GCM errors of different OBM
systems on a single vehicle class, a rigid truck.
Similar results have also been obtained for other
classes of vehicles and will be published in a future
report.
Systems 3, 11 and 12 were found to have larger
variations in the readings. Potential reasons
identified were inconsistent steer axle
measurement/estimation and load shift. Detailed
discussion can be found in the full test report (Karl
et al. 2009).
Figure 3
Accuracy of OBM
systems for trailer 1 of
vehicle
Figure 4
Error by supplier, drive
axle group for all load
conditions
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OBM error by sensor type
Figure 8 compares the errors of different mass
sensors. The values for ‘deflection’ are those for
deflection sensors, usually used to measure steer
axle deflection as a measure of axle mass.
As mentioned for the fuel level tamper tests, the
results listed as ‘estimated’ are for the algorithm
that calculates the OBM based on load distribution.
Typically, this algorithm is used to estimate the
steer axle mass.
As hypothesised for the data in Figure 8, it appears
that the steer axle mass was systematically
underestimated, particularly for deflection sensors.
This effect will need to be managed by the OBM
industry when the OBM team specifies error
margins. This is especially necessary for rigid trucks,
since these types of vehicles rely on correct steer
axle mass to report GCM accurately when loads are
placed at different locations in the load area. It is
recommended that a steer axle sensor be included in
OBM systems for rigid trucks to measure the steer
axle mass accurately.
OBM error by tamper type
Figure 9 shows errors recorded because of the
different tampering events. It shows that inserting
wooden chocks between a load cell and its reference
frame and blocking air to the APTs by shutting the
ball valves were very effective in altering the OBM
readings, confirming the anecdotal efficacy of this
practice (Davis 2008). This effect is being addressed
by the OBM team and is discussed later.
Dynamic data as indication of static mass
When analysed, the dynamic average reading did
not necessarily equate to the static result (using the
same OBM system). It is hypothesised that this was
Figure 5
Error by supplier, GCM
at all load conditions
Figure 6
Error by vehicle type and
GCM for all load
conditions
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Figure 7
Error by system for rigid
trucks
Figure 8
Error by sensor type for
all axle groups
Figure 9
Error by tamper type for
GCM
due (at least in part) to the non-linearities in the
suspension components.
Load for air spring systems was typically measured
via pressure in the airbag; however, this is not the
only path for load to travel from the wheels to the
chassis. Load is also transmitted via the shock
absorber and the suspension hanger (and other
minor contributors; the complexity of the
arrangement is shown in Figure 10).
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Table 3
Summary of errors for reference system and weighbridge
Measurement mode 95% confidence 95% confidence Worst error
interval upper bound interval lower bound (kg)
[kg and (%)]  [kg and (%)]
Weighbridge (single) 55 kg (0.3%) –55(–0.3%) 166
Weighbridge (all) 76 kg (0.4%) –76 kg(–0.4%) 167
Static, normal 346 kg (1.7%) –241 kg(–1.3%) 506
Static, braking 445 kg (2.2%) –372 kg(–1.9%) 1 002
Static, tamper(cf. weighbridge) – – 10 760
Dynamic, normal (cf. static) 725 kg (3.6%) –512 kg(–2.6%) 901
Dynamic, normal (cf. weighbridge) 766 kg (3.8%) –449 kg(–2.2%) 712
Dynamic, tamper (cf. weighbridge) – – 13 339
Analysis of the pattern of fluctuations in the
dynamic mass measurement (as opposed to their
magnitudes) indicated an ability to identify mass
independently; however, the resolution available
from the dynamic data was insufficient to have
confidence in the effectiveness of this approach
(dynamic data would need to be collected for a
longer period). The 150 s records were sufficient to
distinguish tampers causing errors in the order of
20% of the OBM reading. This will be further
explored in the discussion.
Weighbridge accuracy
Weighbridge accuracy could not be determined
precisely because of the lack of an independent
reference. Accordingly, the mean weighbridge result
was used to minimise variation. On this basis, the
following results were recorded.
Figure 10
Generic suspension components highlighting
different load paths
The accuracy of a particular typical weighbridge
was approximately 55 kg (+/–0.3% at 20 t for a
single axle group). The accuracy of all weighbridges
was approximately 76 kg (+/–0.4% at 20 t for a
single axle group). Table 3 presents this information
together with the accuracy of OBM systems under
different conditions. It is observed that static OBM
measurement under normal (manufacturer
specified) conditions provided the best results, while
static measurements under abnormal conditions
and dynamic measurements presented higher levels
of error. Accuracy for tamper tests could not be
obtained, because the severity of tampering could
not be predicted or controlled. Nevertheless, it was
found that tampering with the systems resulted in
the most significant errors.
In Table 3, the 95% confidence intervals have been
normalised at 20 t for both static and dynamic data.
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Summary of results for static tests
The average weighbridge load was used as the best
approximation of the ‘actual’ load; however, as
shown in the previous section, the weighbridge
accuracy was not perfect. Thus, any analysis of
measurements referenced against the weighbridge
load inherently incorporates the weighbridge
variability. Since combined accuracy is determined
by the square root of sum of squares of the individual
accuracies, and the weighbridge uncertainty is
much smaller than that of the reference system (as
shown below), this effect is minor.
The combined weighbridge plus reference system
error for all tests in normal conditions (no tampering,
level ground, brakes off) was –241 kg/+346 kg (–
1.3%/+1.7% at 20 t for a single axle group, Table 3).
The extreme error was –506 kg (–2.5% at 20 t for a
single axle group). That is, 19 of 20 results were
within –241 kg/+346 kg of the weighbridge average;
1 result in 20 was outside this range by as much as
506 kg less than the weighbridge average.
Where conditions were not normal (no tampering
but without ensuring level ground or brakes off), the
error was marginally worse –372 kg/+445 kg (-
1.9%/+2.2% at 20 t for a single axle group, Table 3).
The extreme error was –1002 kg (-5.0% at 20 t for a
single axle group). That is, 19 of 20 results were
within the range –372 kg/+445 kg of the
weighbridge average; 1 result in 20 was outside this
range by as much as 1002 kg less than the
weighbridge average.
Figure 3 shows indicative results for the range of
OBM systems tested with linearity better than 98%
and offsets better than 200 kg from the ideal. The
accuracy over the complete range of OBM systems
tested was within approximately +/–500 kg of GCM
or approximately +/–2% of the attendant
weighbridge reading.
Tamper index (TIX) as a quality metric for
tampering
To determine whether tampering has occurred, a
number of quantitative tampering measures have
been developed. One of these is denoted as the
tampering index (TIX). The TIX and other tampering
metrics are being developed by the OBM team
members. The details of these are, properly, being
kept confidential in order that unscrupulous activity
to undermine them does not occur from reverse
engineering of the details. The tampering index
(TIX) value is a non-dimensional number. It is
proposed as one of a range of quality indicators of
OBM data regarding notification of a potential
tamper event. It uses the range of dynamic data and
is proportional to the range of the dynamic data. If
the load or the speed increases then the range of the
dynamic data would be expected to increase also.
Accordingly, the TIX contains a factor that
normalises the dynamic range so that the values for
TIX occur with their upper and lower bounds within
a relatively narrow range, irrespective of speed or
load.
The TIX has a range between which the dynamic
data from the APTs of a HV may be considered to be
within operating boundaries. TIX plots for the 38
tamper events were derived from the test data. TIX
values of the tampering events were differentiated
from the healthy range of the TIX values for normal
operation without tampering in every case. Figure
11 shows an example of a TIX plot versus GVM for
the right-hand side APTs from an example test HV
in this series of tests. The plot indicates the upper
and lower bounds for normal operation and
dynamic signal results. Note the shaded region
represents the normal working range and upper
and lower bounds of dynamic data of this HV. The
TIX values for the tampering events (circle and
square, right) in Figure 11 are shown to be outside
the normal operational range for dynamic signals.
DISCUSSION
The results from the testing program will contribute
to the current activities of TCA in developing
procedures and specifications that will address the
accuracy, precision, tamper-evidence and
robustness of OBM systems for HV applications
within a regulatory framework.
Dynamic data as indication of static mass
Wheel forces are transmitted to the chassis by a
number of paths (Figure 10). One of these paths is
via the springs; the dampers and the suspension
hanger brackets also transmit wheel forces to the
chassis. Some of these components have non-linear
behaviour (for instance the dampers act with more
restraining force on the down stroke than the up
stroke). Accordingly, the average of dynamic
readings within the air spring for an APT-style
OBM system may not be equal to the static load,
except where the road was perfectly flat and there
was no braking or accelerating. The work of
Sweatman (1983), and others, has indicated that
this is the case. Accordingly, the dynamic average
will, in part, be determined by the nature of the road
surface (rough/smooth) and driving behaviour
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(number and severity of braking actions and
accelerations). Therefore, the dynamic average
would be expected to vary with external
circumstances and may not be able to be calibrated
independently. Figures from previous work indicate
that the mean of dynamic wheel forces are up to +/
–10% of the static value (Davis and Bunker 2008).
Tampering: static data versus dynamic
data
Intentional violation of operational procedures is
simpler on a stationary vehicle than a moving
vehicle. For example, taking OBM readings from a
stationary HV with deflated airbags may result in
under-estimating the mass. This possibility is
highly unlikely for a moving HV due to the potential
damage to the vehicle.
One approach being considered by the OBM team is
to examine and compare the pattern of fluctuations
in the dynamic mass value and compare this with
the static mass value. This is to put in place an
additional quality metric to identify mass. Any
tamper event that affects results in a static situation
should also affect the results recorded dynamically.
As mentioned above, there is still a potential role for
averaged dynamic data in identifying a failure to
implement correct operating procedures in a static
test. However, the pattern recorded in a dynamic
test would be altered by any conceivable tamper. A
robust method using this approach is discussed in
the following section.
Increasing the duration of a dynamic record is
proposed to be the most likely means for improving
the resolution of tamper detection. Increasing the
record length (to somewhere in excess of 10 minutes)
may produce a method of greater accuracy with
increased confidence. Further investigation of the
data is required to determine the possibilities and
practicalities of this approach.
Metrics for tamper-evidence
The pragmatic view of the OBM team was that
tampering would be expected to occur if and when
OBM systems are deployed in a regulatory
framework. The best outcome in these circumstances
would be that reliable tamper-evident metrics would
allow detection of any tamper event. The
instantaneous magnitudes of dynamic mass
measurements are expected to be affected by
tampering or calibration error in a similar way to
static measurements (hence the increased error seen
in those results, above).
Future directions for tamper indication
One tamper-evident indicator will not be robust
enough to prove, or even indicate, tampering. For
comparison, one of the key technical requirements
leading to the success of the robustness of Stage 1 of
the IAP program has been to specify multiple quality
indicators for the data from the GPS output. This
included more than one way to indicate tampering
with GPS units. Similarly, and applying the
Figure 11
Example of tampering index
(TIX) plot against load points
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learnings from the tamper-evidence rigour of the
GPS data from IAP Stage 1, the following logical
chain is proposed for a robust indication of tamper-
event probability.   This approach proposes quality
indicators to hand as a result of these tests. Given
any normal operational scenario for a monitored
HV, a number of metrics would be expected to be
present, including:
• movement of the vehicle (detected via GPS
tracking capability);
• the correct frequency spectrum of the dynamic
data;
• the correct magnitudes of, and peaks in, the
frequency spectrum of any dynamic data;
• the number of peaks in the spectrum of dynamic
data; and
• the tamper index (TIX) and other dynamic
tamper indicators within healthy bounds.
These scenarios will be used by the OBM team to
determine if tampering may have occurred.
As has been proposed and reported (Davis 2008),
an accelerometer mounted in the OBM module on
the chassis may be used to determine if the HV is on
level ground. Some OBM systems use this feature to
provide compensation for non-level vehicle stances
(Davis 2008), correcting for both crossfall and slope.
This allows the operator to judge the veracity of the
OBM system readout accuracy or, in more advanced
applications, correct the raw transducer data for an
allowance due to slope, before displaying a mass
value.
Adding to the above, then, a further proposal may
be to add dynamic signals from the chassis of the
vehicle as it is in motion and as measured by an
accelerometer in the OBM unit to the list of quality
indicators for OBM data reliability, including the
TIX metric.
Tamper detection with load cells vesus
APTs
The issue of tampering with load cells has yet to be
determined. This is due to the inability of the test
program to connect load cells as primary mass
transducers to both the reference system and the
OBM system under test simultaneously. When the
test program was conceived, it was done with the
concept in mind that all primary transducer signals
(e.g. APTs) or their characteristic base quantity (e.g.
pressure) would be monitored by both the reference
system and the OBM system under test. In the case
of load cells, this was not possible because the load
cells could not be connected to two measurement
devices at once. This limitation, which is a limitation
imposed by the physics of the bridges in load cells
in general, meant that no dynamic signals were
measured off load cells during these tests.
Anecdotal data has it that wedges may be inserted
under load cells with the result that the reading
from the load cell indicates less than the actual
applied load. The empirical data from this test
program has shown that view to be the case. A small
series of tests by the TCA team will use the reference
system with suitable modifications, to measure the
dynamic signals from load cells before and after
tampering using the wedging technique. It is hoped
that the TIX measure, when applied to this data,
will show that tampering has occurred in these
instances. The nature of the TIX algorithm, taking
into account that the effect of the wedge would be to
scale the entire signal, suggests that this approach
has a good chance of success.
More development of the TIX and other tamper-
indication metrics will be undertaken by the on-
board mass team. Nonetheless, even with the
hopeful directions provided with the TIX and
dynamic data, further investigations are required
before a robust tamper-evident methodology is
implemented.
CONCLUSION
The results from the testing program will contribute
to TCA developing procedures and specifications
that will address four key areas: accuracy and
robustness, additional data, human machine
interface, and tamper evidence.
All the systems tested showed accuracies within
approximately ±500 kg of GCM or approximately
±2% of the attendant weighbridge reading. Axle
group mass accuracies were similarly close and
within approximately ±150 kg or ±0.75% for a 20 t
group mass.
The test program has investigated the potential use
of dynamic OBM data as validation of information
from the static data recorded by these OBM systems.
Agreed best-practice guidelines and procedures for
installation, calibration, operation and
maintenance, including consideration of tare mass,
will be developed as TCA moves into the regulatory
phase for OBM implementation.
The main areas of potential tampering have been
addressed in the test program and development of
both technical and business options to detect these
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events will need to be addressed for implementation
of regulatory OBM system application to Australian
HVs.
Vulnerability of mechanical and pneumatic systems
to degradation, drift and tampering (Karl 2007) will
need to be further investigated in order to achieve
OBM implementation in the IAP environment.
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